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Abstract   Recent studies of later prehistoric cave use have stressed the affective 
qualities of these natural spaces. Certain properties of caves, darkness, constriction 
and their active geomorphology for example, can lead to caves be characterised as 
active agents, natural places with profound powers. However, is it really plausible 
to interpret caves, inanimate geological formations, as active agents? This paper 
will review arguments on social, environmental and material agency. This will 
include Structuration theory, with its emphasis on human consciousness as a key 
aspect of agency, Ingold's 'Dwelling perspective', which allows the possibility of 
non-human agents, the work of Alfred Gell and Actor Network Theory. Two 
common threads are drawn from these approaches to describe the way that things 
act. Things act in accordance with the properties they have and in a way that is 
structured and enabled by their past history. From this perspective caves can be 
shown to act and therefore caves would have been perceived as having agency. 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on previous research around memory and human remains in 
caves, particularly on Neolithic artefacts and human remains from caves in Britain 
(Peterson 2013). In that paper it was argued that long term social memory was 
constructed at cave burial sites, among other places, through a combination of 
human actions and transformations to place. Central to this process was both the 
embodied agency of groups of mourners and the feedback received from objects 
such as decaying corpses or cave spaces. It was suggested that the passage of time 
was indexed by both changes to caves but also by changes made by caves. Mourners 
had agency, but so did the recently deceased body being mourned and the distinctive 
natural formation where the burial took place. This analysis took for granted that 
theory around agency could be usefully applied, not only to living human actors, 
but also to the dead and to the caves they were buried in. The second part of that 
assumption raised a number of substantial questions around what precisely we mean 
when we discuss the agency of non-human (or formerly human) actors. Therefore, 
this chapter will review the theoretical background to studies of agency in 
archaeology and related disciplines. In particular, it will focus on what we imply 
when we suggest that a geological structure, such as a cave, has agency. 
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Recent wider research in cave archaeology has drawn upon the idea that the physical 
properties of cave systems can be said to ‘act’ upon people in various ways. Bjerck 
(2012) analysed the placement of Bronze Age anthropomorphic rock art in 
Norwegian caves in terms of the profound sensory and bodily experiences created 
by being in dark and restricted places. In this example the response of human actors 
to a particular set of sensory cues seems to have led to particular parts of certain 
caves becoming ‘sacred’ or ritualized, and therefore to have become appropriate 
places for the creation of rock art. 
In a somewhat similar case from the Slovenian karst, Mlekuž (2011) draws on 
Gibson’s (1986) concept of the ‘affordance’ to discuss how the bodies of Neolithic 
sheep and shepherds were created through repeated encounters with caves. 
Affordances are the specific properties that a cave possesses in relation to a 
particular human or animal user. Mlekuž analyses cave affordances by drawing on 
the concept of the ‘affect’ as defined by Brian Massumi in his introduction to 
Deleuze and Guttari (1987, xvi). Massumi’s definition describes affect as the pre-
cognitive bodily responses to a physical encounter with another body. These are 
separate from conscious or emotional response and are held to underpin both 
consciousness and emotional responses to other bodies. Mlekuž (2011, 3-4) 
broadens this definition to look at how the constricted space of caves influences 
affect between human and animal bodies and between bodies and the cave space 
itself. The cave space thus becomes a key part of the creation of new kinds of bodies 
associated with Neolithic domesticity and pastoralism. 
Both Bjerck and Mlekuž discuss the way in which cave spaces act upon living 
bodies. In her study of Earlier Neolithic cave burials from Yorkshire, Leach (2008, 
39) has identified a potentially important way in which caves and cave systems act 
upon the dead. At Cave Ha 3, near Settle, four individuals were buried within an 
actively forming tufa deposit while their bodies were still articulated. Leach (2008, 
51) suggests that this was a deliberate choice and cites other known examples of 
Early Neolithic votive deposition associated with tufa (Davies and Lewis 2004, 8). 
She argues (Leach 2008, 51) that the petrifying properties of tufa springs were 
actively incorporated into the burial rites at some caves, either to commemorate 
particular individuals or to hold them apart from the more collective rites used on 
other Early Neolithic burials in the region. In either case, it could be argued that the 
agency of the cave system was being deliberately invoked. 
Research such as this opens up a wider range of questions around the agency of 
caves and other natural places. What exactly do we mean when we talk about a cave 
having agency? Is agency even an appropriate term to use to describe something 
inanimate like a rock formation? Agency as a descriptive term is both powerful and 
fluid but it has its origins in theory about human interaction and human social 
institutions. In applying it to the three examples above we are pre-supposing a 
definition of agency which makes it a property of both inanimate objects and living 
subjects. We also need to consider how we differentiate between the dead and the 
living body. Similarly, we would need to question any distinction we might make 
between inhabited place and Cartesian space. Many different formulations of 
agency are possible, which would give different weights to these different 
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properties. The aim of this paper is to review some of the wider social theory about 
agency and, in particular, to compare theories of practice. By comparing theories of 
practice about agency it is possible to move towards using agency theory, in the 
broadest sense, in thinking about the human use of caves. 
2.2 Defining Agency 
2.2.1 Structuration Theory 
Theory about agency in archaeology was initially developed by Barrett (1988) as 
an attempt to sidestep a dichotomy between two different perceptions of the 
archaeological record. Barrett drew extensively on both the Structuration Theory of 
Giddens (1984) and the work of Bourdieu (1977). He sought to move archaeological 
analysis away from studying patterns in artefacts (whether these were conceived of 
as analogous to texts or to fossils) and to find a methodology for thinking about the 
way that relationships between people were structured (Barrett 1984, 8-10). In 
Giddens’ early writings on the subject (for example, Giddens 1979, 2-3) 
structuration is presented as a way of creating a theory of action in the social 
sciences. For Giddens (1979, 51-53), theories of individual human action developed 
in philosophy had little impact on a sociology which was concerned almost 
exclusively with the analysis of large scale social structures. Therefore, the theory 
of structuration can be seen as an attempt to overcome the disjunction between 
Structuralist and Marxist accounts of modern human society, social determinist 
analyses which give a disproportionate weight to large scale impersonal forces, and 
a decontextualized philosophy of human intentions and actions.  
Giddens (1979, 56: 1984, 5) developed a ‘stratification’ model of the agent for this 
purpose. As we shall see throughout this chapter, geological metaphors of depth and 
stratification are an important common theme in theory about agency more broadly. 
Giddens’ stratification model begins with motivation of the action, moves onto 
rationalisation of the action and then onto reflexive monitoring of the action. 
However, it is important to realise that these three layers cannot be worked out 
independently of the surrounding structure, which Giddens characterises as both the 
unintended conditions of the action and its unintended consequences. Without this 
surrounding structure then there is nothing to motive the action, no context within 
which to rationalise it and no comparative standard for the reflexive monitoring of 
the action. 
Nested within this model of agency is another metaphorical set of layers to define 
human actions and their functioning in a specific way and within a particular set of 
conditions. Giddens’ (1984, 7) definition of the way an agent acts is grounded in a 
tripartite model of human consciousness, ultimately derived from psychoanalytic 
theory. At the lowest level are unconscious motives, above this is the realm of 
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practical consciousness and above that discursive consciousness. These two models 
together provide a methodology for working out a recursive relationship between 
individuals’ thoughts and actions and the structures which govern their society. 
Structuration theory analyses four important components to provide a model which 
aims to describe both large scale institutions and individual human action. These 
are: human action; social structure; power and time. The preceding paragraphs have 
described the analysis of human action. For Giddens (1984, 4), human beings are 
fundamentally ‘knowledgeable actors’. The interplay of practical and discursive 
consciousness ensure that people are able to carry out their routine lives. The 
conditions and consequences of actions within the stratification model of the agent 
ensures that knowledgeable actors understand wider social structures and how to 
use and influence them to achieve their own ends. 
The analysis of social structures (Giddens 1984, 25) also follows from the 
implications of the stratification model of the agent. In structuration theory all 
institutions are made up of the actions of knowledgeable actors. They form the 
unacknowledged conditions of actions and are created from their unacknowledged 
consequences. Giddens (1984, 16-34, for example) analyses many different 
definitions of social institutions but for our purposes the key part of structuration 
theory as it relates to social structures is his concept of the ‘duality of structure’ 
(Giddens 1979, 69). This states that social structures are both the medium within 
which actions take place and are created from the outcomes of these actions. 
Therefore, social institutions cannot be reified as something abstracted from human 
action (Giddens 1984, 34). This, as Barrett (1988, 8) has noted, is a very powerful 
argument for the archaeological utility of the duality of structure. 
The analysis of time and memory within structuration theory is similarly linked to 
the stratification model of the agent. Actions take place over time, they are 
influenced by the memory of past actions and they will have consequences for future 
actions. However, what is important here is not the chronometric time of empirical 
measurement but the lived experience of time. This leads Giddens (1984, 35-6) to 
consider yet another stratigraphic system of classifications around the human 
experience of time. Day to day experience is regarded as essentially repetitive 
(‘reversible’ in the terminology Giddens borrows from Levi-Strauss). The life of 
any one individual, however, has a clear directionality arising from memory and 
bodily changes. Institutions, in Giddens’ view, have their own form of reversible 
time. The duality of structure discussed above operates within time, existing 
structures constrain actions and are created from them through time. This 
combination of the repetitive nature of reversible time and the directionality of 
individual lifespans is a fundamental part of the working of the duality of structure. 
The analysis of power within structuration theory (for example Giddens 1979, 88-
91) assumes that social rules and conventions are not neutral, they always serve 
someone’s or some group’s ends. However, as they are made up of the actions of 
people in society they are also always open to being reworked and renegotiated as 
they are created and perpetuated. According to Giddens (1984, 15-16) power is 
implicated in all kinds of action, it is not something intrinsic to certain types of 
behaviour such as domination or resistance. The duality of structure implies that 
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resources can both constrain and enable actors in different ways and to different 
degrees. 
From the perspective of the archaeological analysis of agency, then the central 
contribution of structuration theory is to place the emphasis of study on human 
action and bodily experience. The creation of the duality of structure (Giddens 1984, 
25-6) from memory traces links both these aspects.  
2.2.2 Habitus 
However, with the notable exception of Mizoguchi (1993), archaeological studies 
drawing on pure structuration theory have been relatively rare. The early work of 
Bourdieu (especially Bourdieu 1977) has therefore been an important point of 
reference as agency was integrated into archaeological work. For Barrett (1988, 27), 
Bourdieu’s work offered a corrective to a perceived lack of focus on the material 
world in Giddens’ writing, whereas for Gardner (2004, 7), Bourdieu allowed a more 
nuanced grasp of problems of subordination and domination.  
Bourdieu’s work is explicitly concerned with developing a theory of practice 
(Bourdieu 1977: 1990). Of particular interest here is the concept of ‘habitus’, the 
analysis of daily routines of everyday life. Habitus is the unconscious knowledge of 
what constitutes appropriate behaviour used by people to get through their day to 
day life. As such it is both generally unarticulated (practical consciousness in 
Giddens’ (1984, 7) terms) and extremely culturally specific (Bourdieu 1977, 72). 
However, as Giddens is careful to point to a variable and permeable boundary 
between practical and discursive consciousness, Bourdieu also stresses the 
‘creative, active and inventive capacities of habitus’ (Bourdieu 1985, 13). 
Habitus is an example of Bourdieu’s belief that theory cannot be developed in 
philosophical isolation. It is necessary to apply theory to practice in order to develop 
and understand it (Bourdieu 1985, 12-14). Therefore, Bourdieu articulates the 
details of what habitus is by the use of concrete examples. Although his discussion 
of the relationship between structures and habitus draws on a wide range of 
philosophical positions about consciousness (Bourdieu 1977, 73-95) it does not 
require a specific, stratified model of how consciousness works for its effectiveness. 
In other works, Bourdieu (1985, 14) has talked about the need to find a way of 
discussing agency while getting away from the ‘philosophy of consciousness’. 
Bourdieu moves away from a top-down view of structures by studying the taken for 
granted routines of daily life. In his phraseology, habitus becomes not only the 
‘structuring structure’ but also the ‘structured structure’ (Bourdieu 1984, 170). That 
is to say that social structures and institutions are both created from and reinforced 
by the actions of habitus. In both Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s work the apparent 
circularity of this argument is overcome by invoking the action of memory. 
Bourdieu (1977, 87) discusses the concrete example of the way in which learning 
within the family underpins the way learning is experienced in school, which in turn 
underpins the way learning is experienced in later life.  
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For archaeological applications of the concept of habitus, and particularly for cave 
archaeology, then the most positive effect of Bourdieu’s insistence on theory as 
practice is its engagement with the material world. In numerous detailed examples 
the structures developed in habitus are real physical structures. Whether it is on the 
French proletarian dining table (Bourdieu 1984, 193-200) or within the Kabyle 
house of Algeria (Bourdieu 1977, 89-91), then what is being analysed are 
relationships between people which are mediated through material culture and how 
that material culture is deployed in space. 
2.2.3 Environment and Agency 
Classical structuration theory ties agency very firmly to particular stratified models 
of human consciousness and therefore caves, as inanimate objects, can’t plausibly 
be described as having this kind of agency. Caves do not have discursive or practical 
consciousness therefore they are not, in Giddens’ terms, agents. Bourdieu’s 
pragmatic focus on theory as practice and his focus on space and materiality offer a 
more promising programme for the study of the interaction between living people 
and caves. However, there is no sense within Bourdieu’s work that the Kabyle 
house, for example, has habitus as distinct from the Kabyle women and men who 
inhabit it. 
Building on the material perspective developed in the review of Bourdieu’s work, 
other strands of theory about agency can also be worked into a discussion of cave 
archaeology. Ingold’s essay Building, dwelling, living develops a detailed argument 
to dissolve the distinction between the cultural world of human agents with 
consciousness and the natural environment (Ingold 2000, 172-88). Interestingly, 
Ingold (2000, 172) begins this essay by characterising the traditional divide between 
culture and the environment as a distinction between intentionally motivated human 
agency, the ‘social domain’ and the ‘ecological domain’ of relationships between 
animals and the environment. Ingold’s (2000, 173) stated project is to find a ‘new 
ecology’ which rethinks the way both animals and humans are perceived as 
interacting with their environment. The problematic issue for Ingold is 
intentionality, what people do is intentionally motivated, what animals do is 
apparently not. However, both Giddens (1984, 3-14) and Bourdieu (1977, 72) 
devoted considerable space to discussing non-intentional agency in people. Ingold 
(2000) focusses his argument on intentionality, discursive consciousness in 
Giddens’ terms, presumably as a rhetorical device to stress the synthesising power 
of his ‘new ecology’. 
Ingold (2000, 174-81) develops this ‘new ecology’ by resolving a perceived 
distinction between the structures made by animals, for example, spider webs, 
beaver lodges and ape nests, and structures designed and constructed by people. The 
former are usually described as the results of biological imperatives encountering 
particular ecological conditions and the latter as the results of intentional human 
design (Ingold 2000, 181). Ingold draws on Heidegger (1971, 145-61 particularly) 
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to develop a ‘dwelling perspective’ to unify the description of both these kinds of 
making and, therefore, of both human and animal agency. 
In the dwelling perspective, in common with structuration theory and habitus, 
agency is developed through the passage of time and of memory (Ingold 2000, 186). 
Both humans and other animals dwell within environments which have been 
fashioned by previous activity. Their actions are structured by those environments 
and they in turn create new kinds of environment. Therefore, for Ingold (2000, 187-
8) agency does not operate in isolation from its surroundings. Both human and 
animal agents respond to pre-existing structures and conditions in similar ways and 
create and modify these environments by their actions. The recursively organised 
connection between structure and agency has been embodied and materialised in a 
way which allows us to see no fundamental difference between the building of 
beaver lodges and the building of houses. The dwelling perspective therefore 
suggests that we can ascribe agency to non-human animals.  
In other writing on this theme Ingold (1993) elaborates on the role of temporality in 
the dwelling perspective. He coins the neologism ‘taskscape’ to describe an array 
of related activities, analogous to ‘landscape’ as an array of related features (Ingold 
1993, 158). Taskscape is the material equivalent of Giddens’ structures, it is both 
the medium within which actions take place and is created from the outcomes of 
those actions. One of the important contributions which Ingold makes to this debate 
is to find a similarly embodied description of the way the passage of time is 
experienced. As we have seen, time and memory are a crucial part of the recursive 
cycle that lies at the heart of structuration theory, habitus and the dwelling 
perspective. Ingold (1993, 159) uses the phrase temporality to describe a conception 
of time, derived from the phenomenological understanding of Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, 416-21), which is neither tied to specific models of human consciousness nor 
calibrated to an external constant. When people or other animals do things they 
make time pass. Temporality is the time of the participant. 
Therefore, from Ingold we can gather both a continuity of broad themes around 
agency: the recursive duality of structure and agency; and the importance of an 
experiential approach to time. However, what is novel in this work is the extension 
of Bourdieu’s concerns with objects and space to see the material basis of both 
structure and time. The second major contribution of the dwelling perspective is to 
see that agency is not limited to animals with human consciousness. 
2.2.4 Art with Agency 
Although Ingold’s arguments are persuasive, they do not necessarily resolve the 
problem of environments with agency. Caves, as conventionally described, are 
inanimate objects and therefore they do not spin webs or build nests. Accepting for 
the moment, although we shall return to this point later, the description of caves as 
inanimate then further discussion is needed on the nature of the agency of inanimate 
objects. There is an extensive literature on the agency of such objects. An excellent 
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review from an archaeological perspective is provided by Alberti and Bray (2009). 
As they point out (Alberti and Bray 2009, 339-40) archaeological approaches to this 
problem have largely followed either the work of Gell (1998) or of Latour (2005). 
The distinction between these two approaches can be characterised, following 
Alberti and Bray (2009, 340), as lying between those, such as Gell, who maintain a 
distinction between the intrinsic agency of living subjects and the ascribed agency 
of passive objects, and those, such as Latour, who would describe the agency of 
both people and things in the same way. For Gell (1998, 16) agency is what allows 
us to distinguish between ‘happenings’, something which happens because of the 
consequences of natural physical laws, and ‘actions’ which are caused by prior 
human intentions. Agency is therefore strongly identified not merely with human 
consciousness but also with deliberate human intentions. 
Despite this, Gell (1998, 13-17) goes on to develop a thesis which ascribes 
extremely powerful agency to art objects. In order to follow this argument, it is 
necessary to introduce two further pieces of terminology. Gell (1998, 13) sidesteps 
the debate about how precisely we should define art by developing the concept of 
the ‘index’. An index is any object which has the property of permitting people to 
make a ‘causal inference’. Gell (1998, 13) uses the example of the smile, which we 
use to infer friendliness. This kind of inference is not a matter of axiomatic truth, 
nor is it a linguistic convention, rather it is a kind of synthesis based on the informal 
probabilities of previous experience. Gell (1998, 14-15) borrows the term 
‘abduction’ from semiotics to describe this kind of inference. An index therefore, is 
any object which permits abductions to be made from it. However, in order to focus 
his argument more tightly on the agency of objects, Gell (1998, 15-16) further 
restricts the definition of an index to stipulate that it must permit an abduction that 
some kind of social agency must lie behind the creation of the index. The important 
point which Gell (1998, 17) makes in defining this agency is that it does not have 
to be part of a ‘philosophically defensible’ system of thought about agency. It 
merely has to be an example of a way in which agency is or has been thought about 
by people.  
Gell (1998, 19) uses the example of ‘vehicular animism’, the modern western habit 
of ascribing personalities and power to cars, to illustrate the way in which this 
agency can be held to belong to non-human agents. This habit of mind is regarded 
by Gell as fundamentally irrational but is nevertheless an example of a commonly 
held belief about agency. It is therefore a potential object of study, but it throws up 
a considerable paradox when considered in the light of the definition of agency cited 
above, where human ‘action’ is contrasted with natural ‘happenings’. To resolve 
this paradox Gell (1998, 20-21) suggests that we classify agents into two groups. 
‘Primary agents’ are intentional beings whereas ‘secondary agents’ are objects 
through which primary agents distribute their agency. Gell (1998, 140-1) draws on 
the idea of distributed personhood, especially Wagner (1991), to stress that 
secondary agents are not in any sense inauthentic but rather that they are the 
distributed material aspects of primary agency. For Gell, objects have agency as 
distributed parts of the people who have made and used them. Any other agent 
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encountering such an object is able, through a process of abduction, to infer things 
about the primary agent. Such an object ‘embodies intentionalities’ (Gell 1996, 36). 
 
2.2.5 Actors and Networks 
While Gell’s characterisation of the agency of inanimate objects is very persuasive, 
this is not a completely helpful solution to the problem for prehistorians. It does not 
seem to provide us with a clear and obvious methodology we should use if we want 
to identify what it was about a cave which may have led people in the past to ascribe 
agency to it. Gell’s characterisation of object agency is an example of what Pels 
(1998, 94) would describe as ‘animist’ object agency, in which things have life 
because an external soul or spirit is perceived as inhabiting them. Pels (1998, 95) 
contrasts this with ‘fetishist’ object agency, in which an object’s power comes from 
the very nature of the materials of which it is comprised. This internal, materialistic 
perspective leads us to consider a whole range of different approaches to object 
agency which have three things in common. These are a fundamental critique of the 
distinction between active subjects and passive objects, a focus on the relationships 
between objects and people, and a ‘flat ontology’ which does not prioritize one kind 
of agent or structure over another. Examples of this kind of thinking include the 
‘relational realist’ archaeology proposed by Fowler (2013, 20-67), the ‘symmetrical 
archaeology’ described in Shanks (2007), and, in the broader social sciences, the 
‘assemblage theory’ associated with De Landa (2006). 
All of these writers draw to a greater or lesser extent on the ‘Actor-Network Theory’ 
developed by Latour (2005) and colleagues. This provides us with very different 
way of thinking about the agency of inanimate objects to that proposed by Gell. At 
the heart of actor-network theory is Latour’s (2005, 70-74) critique of the distinction 
between active subjects and passive objects. In contrast to Gell’s (1998, 20-21) 
categorization of primary and secondary agents, Latour (2005, 46) declares ‘an actor 
is what is made to act by many others’. He adopts the technical term ‘actant’ to 
describe this property of making a difference which can apply equally to people, 
animals or objects. The ‘actant’ is introduced in a way which does not require it to 
possess any kind of consciousness or intentionality: 
‘Kettles ‘boil’ water, knives ‘cut’ meat, baskets ‘hold’ provisions… ..if action is limited a 
priori  to what ‘intentional’, ‘meaningful’ humans do it is hard to see how a hammer could 
act.. …any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor.. … 
the question to ask about any agent is simply the following: Does it make a difference in 
the course of some other agent’s action or not?’ (Latour 2005, 71) 
For Latour (2005, 72) objects as actants allow, afford, permit, encourage, block or 
forbid actions. They don’t themselves ‘have agency’ but then, neither is there a 
separate category of humans with intentions who possess agency. Agency exists in 
the network of relationships between the actants. 
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Relationships between actants are central to actor-network theory precisely because 
Latour (2005, 75-6) does maintain that there is a significant difference between 
subjects and objects. Actor-network theory can potentially analyse all networks that 
involve human social agency, it is not supposed to pre-judge which of the actants in 
these networks has priority, but the presence of human subjects is necessary for the 
analysis to take place (Latour 2005, 78). Therefore, it is not ‘symmetrical’ in quite 
the way that term is used by Fowler (2013, 30). Latour (2005, 171-2) is also 
sceptical about the usefulness of both the highly localised study of actors’ agency 
and the study of wider social structures. This leads him to a concern with 
metaphorical ‘flattening’, a focus on the descriptive analysis of the connections 
between actants, without making a priori assumptions about the kind of actant they 
are.  
Theory of practice in actor-network theory draws on the analogy of map-making, 
connections should be described and followed wherever they lead without 
disjunctures or jumps between different scales of analysis (Latour 2005, 174). 
However, this focus on local connectedness needs to recognize that that the local 
situations which are being described are not created from nothing. Latour (2005, 
194-5) replaces the ‘structure’ of structuration theory with actual physical things. 
Places and objects are actants in the network and they act, in a somewhat similar 
way to Gell’s (1998, 14-16) indexes, to connect the network being described in the 
local present, with other previously existing networks. Places and objects are also 
embedded in different times (Latour 2005, 200-1), in any given interaction some of 
them will be ancient and others newly created. The third major practical implication 
of actor-network theory is that the descriptions it furnishes are necessarily 
incomplete. Latour (2005, 246) is clear that we should resist the temptation to ‘fill 
in the blanks’, to assume that some ineffable essence of society is held between the 
connecting strands of the network. 
From the perspective of actor-network theory, caves can be considered as actants. 
They are places and objects which would be drawn into the network of connections 
associated with any human use of them. As physical and temporal spaces they 
would also act to link older and more recent networks together. Each of the different 
discussions of agency which have been considered so far makes a different kind of 
contribution to the study of caves as agents. Ultimately, the question for us is not 
which of these formulations of agency are right, or even, which is the most 
persuasive as an abstract description, but which provides us with a workable 
programme of research. 
2.3 Towards an archaeology of active caves 
2.3.1 How do Caves Act? 
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The first point which arises from the preceding discussion is the danger of reifying 
‘agency’ as a social force, something which is somehow above or behind the actions 
of people and things. Following the lead of Ingold (2007), who sought to shift from 
the study of ‘materiality’ to the study of the ‘properties of materials’, we should 
transpose the opening question of this paper from ‘do caves have agency?’ to ‘how 
do caves act?’ Throughout this paper we have been concerned with theories of 
practice for this reason. How do different thinkers describe the ways in which 
people and things act? 
The first common thread we can see is that how people and things act is strongly 
influenced by what they are like. They act in the way they do because of the 
properties they have. For Giddens (1984, 4), the property which matters is the 
stratified model of the consciousness, the specific interplay between practical and 
discursive consciousness. In Bourdieu’s (1977, 72) work a similar role is played by 
the culturally specific ‘habitus’ of any individual. Both of these concepts are 
embodied, material and also historically contingent (Rorty 1989, 30-43). Ingold 
(2007, 14) gives us a similar way of thinking about why things act. The properties 
of materials are parts of processes and relations, they are experienced, once again 
they are embodied and historically contingent. Similarly, for Gell (1996, 36), things 
which can act are things which embody intentionalities. They have the property of 
being visibly altered or placed in a way which makes them the kind of object which 
is comprehensible to an observer as part of the distributed agency of another person. 
In Latour’s work (2005, 71) the way that both people and objects make a difference 
is governed by their material form. They allow, encourage, facilitate or block 
actions depending on what they are made from. 
2.3.2 Properties of Caves 
Therefore, the way that caves act will be structured by their physical form. If we 
think about Ingold’s (2000, 186) definition of the dwelling perspective as relating 
to something which affects and is affected by its environment, then we can broaden 
this insight beyond the living non-human animals which form the bulk of Ingold’s 
examples. Both the caves in the examples cited from Bjerck (2012) and Mlekuž 
(2011) at the start of the paper and the decomposing bodies described by Leach 
(Leach 2008) affect their environment and are affected by it. Caves act in the way 
they do, at least in part, because they are constricted spaces. However, across later 
Prehistoric Europe we also have evidence of the importance of other properties of 
caves. They are dark, underground spaces, often difficult to access and might be 
summed up as sharing the property of separateness (see, for example, the 
discussions in Dowd & Hensey 2016). 
At Glencurran Cave, Co. Clare, Ireland, excavations by Dowd (2009, 98) showed 
evidence of the Late Bronze Age deposition of lithics and shell beads in association 
with neonatal remains of humans, wild and domestic animals. This practice took 
place at least 50 m into the cave, in the zone of permanent darkness, and much 
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deeper into the system than the Middle Bronze Age burials from the same site 
(Dowd 2009, figure 10.2). The deposit is interpreted by Dowd (2009, 98) as a single 
complex event, gaining at least part of its meaning and power from its location in 
the dark zone of the cave. 
Sites in Scotland also indicate the way that the physical separateness of caves could 
be both drawn upon by and act on people and objects. At High Pasture Cave, Skye, 
passages appear to have been deliberately modified in the Middle Iron Age to create 
a stairway down into an extensive cave system (Birch et al. 2003). At the Sculptor’s 
Cave, Covesea, Aberdeenshire there is evidence for ritual activity in both the Late 
Bronze Age and Later Iron Age. This is a site which would have only been 
accessible from the sea and, given the constraints of the surrounding hydrography 
and tidal conditions, would have required very specific knowledge of these natural 
phenomena to approach at all (Armit et al. 2011, 254-5 and Ian Armit pers. comm.). 
Caves also act in more physical ways, water, mud and screes all flow through them, 
often substantially moving any objects within the cave, as for example, at 
Pontnewydd Cave in North Wales (Aldhouse-Green et al. 2013, 255). There are 
good examples of how the active properties of caves and their associated fluvial 
systems were drawn upon in later Prehistory. At Le Trou de Han, Han-sur-Lesse, 
large scale ritual deposition of metalwork took place in the Late Bronze Age in two 
specific locations of the underground sections of the river Lesse (Warmenbol 2014, 
69-73). Further south, in Charente, France, Manem (2012, 142-9), discusses the 
consistent association between cave deposition of pottery in the Middle Bronze Age 
Duffaits culture and river submergences. At both Perrats Cave and Duffaits Cave 
there was deliberate deposition of groups of sherds made by the same potter and 
this practice was shared with the nearby enclosure site at Fouilloux. All three sites 
are within 800 metres of the submergence points of four substantial rivers. Manem 
(2012, 146-149) suggests that in the case of the Duffaits culture we have a specific 
depositional practice focussed on karstic aquifer features. In these cases, we see 
practices which drew on two inter-connected kinds of separation, of being both 
underground and underwater, to move artefacts away from the everyday world. 
Caves also have the ability to trap and petrify material in speleothem deposits. In 
addition to the tufa encrusted material described by Leach (2008, 51), prehistoric 
human bone has been reported from within flowstone at Carsington Pasture Cave, 
Derbyshire (Barnatt & Edmonds 2002, 117) and from Longu Frescu Cave, Sardinia 
(Skeates 2016, 41). Detailed evidence of the interaction of human and cave agency 
around speleothems is provided in Whitehouse’s (2015) review of the cult of 
‘abnormal water’ in Italian Neolithic caves. In Puglia, at Grotta Sceloria and 
probably also Grotta di Porto Badisco, pottery vessels were placed on broken 
stalagmite surfaces, apparently to collect the precipitating water from the stalactites 
above. These vessels in turn became petrified parts of the remodelled stalagmites 
(Whitehouse 2015, 57-58). Therefore, in the Italian Neolithic, we can see direct 
evidence of the interplay between human and material agency in caves through time. 
This material evidence of the role of time brings us back to our consideration of 
theories of practice about how people and things act. Alongside the structure of the 
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caves’ physical form, the second common thread in all the theories of agency we 
have considered is a concern with the passage of time and memory. 
2.3.3 Caves, Time and Memory 
In all the theories about agency we have considered, the passage of time is 
fundamental to the recursively organized nature of action, the ‘duality of 
structure’, as it is described by Giddens (1979, 69). In the work of both Giddens 
(1984, 35-6) and Bourdieu (1977, 87), what is important is the lived experience of 
time. In essence, people act as a consequence of their memories and create a 
framework for future actions by remembering the consequences of past actions. 
With the dwelling perspective, Ingold (2000, 186) develops an environmentally 
embodied version of this recursive ‘duality of structure’. Central to this is the 
definition of temporality as the ‘time of the participant’ (Ingold 1993, 159), when 
things act they experience time passing. We can strengthen this insight by drawing 
on the way that Gell (1998, 13-15) defines an index. Temporality is not simply 
experienced, it is embodied and materialized in the scars and traces these actions 
leave on the world (Peterson 2013, 273-4). Latour (2005, 200-1) points out that 
both places and objects are embedded in different times. They contain within 
themselves the histories of their previous manufacture or use. In actor-network 
theory all these connections are potentially informative, they should all be 
followed. 
It follows that we should analyse the ways that caves act through this embodied 
and material experience of time. Caves act as they do because people have 
previous embodied experience to draw on when they encounter them. They are 
also able to act thorough the indexes and traces that are left in them. For example, 
the Romano-British cemetery established in chamber 4, Wookey Hole (Hawkes et 
al. 1978) indicates a repeated use of one particular place within the cave. A 
minimum of 28 individuals were placed on a spit of cave sediment at the back of 
chamber 4 during the later 3rd century AD. Enough skeletal material remained in 
situ to show that the bodies were not placed in gave cuts and that waterborne silts 
accumulated around the bodies as they lay on the surface (Hawkes et al. 1978, 26-
28). The types and frequency of grave goods at Wookey Hole can be paralleled at 
other late 3rd century cemeteries in south-western England, in many ways these 
were entirely typical burials for the period (Hawkes et al. 1978, 30-31). 
Presumably they drew upon a habitus of social responses to death which had 
developed in common across the region and province as part of the transition to 
inhumation burial in the 3rd century AD. However, they did so in such a way that 
responded both to a particular cave environment and to what appears to have been 
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(Hawkes et al. 1978, 29) about 100 years of cemetery use. This time depth would 
have been indexed by the presence of bodies in various stages of decomposition 
covered to different degrees by the periodic silting from the flooding of the river 
Axe. The selection for the cemetery of the back of the deepest accessible part of 
the system, 200 metres from the entrance, was probably, as Hawkes et al. (1978, 
30) suggest, driven by a belief that the point of emergence of the Axe from the 
rock in chamber 4 was spiritually significant. On this model, the river Axe itself 
was more than a passive natural phenomenon to be referenced, it was an active 
contributor to the on-going funerary activity at the site. 
We can see the impact of these interactions particularly in the longer term fate of 
parts of these bodies after the Roman period. Flooding events in the cave moved 
the crania from many of these burials and caused them to be re-deposited at 
different locations nearer the cave entrance (Hawkes et al. 1978, 25). The cave 
removed the skulls and collected them in a new deposit. This is an action which 
was only possible because of the past geological history of the streamway in 
combination with the hydrodynamic properties of particular skeletal elements, the 
disarticulated crania in particular would float (Nawrocki et al.1997). However it 
was also only possible because of the past decision to place the Romano-British 
bodies on the sediment surface, rather than burying them, and to place them close 
to the emergence of the Axe in chamber 4. 
Caves, then, do act. We can describe their actions in terms which draw upon 
agency theory to give ourselves a powerful theory of practice to interpret those 
actions. However, it may be objected that we have stretched some of these 
definitions almost to breaking point. In the example given above all of the actions 
ascribed to the cave can also be described as the result of geochemical or 
biological processes which would have taken place regardless of any further 
human intervention. Did the cave then ‘act’. To answer this question, we can 
return to Gell (1998, 19) and his insight that we do not need to describe 
‘philosphically plausible’ agency for some thing to have acted. Caves undoubtedly 
have acted and people, who shared their material, temporal and embodied world, 
would have perceived them to have agency. 
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